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Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-03-01 , DOI: 10.1111/phib.12123
Bill Brewer 1
Affiliation  

What is the role of conscious experience in the epistemology of perceptual knowledge? In particular, suppose that I see an object before me and thereby come to know that it is red or round: how exactly are we to understand the contribution that my seeing that thing makes to my epistemic standing in relation to its colour or shape? I assume without argument, following Williamson (2000, esp. ch. 1), that seeing that o is F is a way of knowing that o is F. I also take for granted our intuitive conviction that in certain basic cases of seeing that o is F, the fact that the subject sees o itself is integral to their epistemic status as cases of knowing that o is F. My question is how this is to be understood: how should we characterize what is going on in seeing that o is F, in such cases, in order to illuminate the contribution of seeing o to their status as cases of knowing that o is F. This will not involve any commitment to the idea that seeing o in such cases constitutes or contributes to their satisfaction of an entirely general necessary condition on knowing that o is F (see Williamson, 2000, ch. 1, and Roessler 2009). Nevertheless, there is genuine explanation and intelligibility to be had; and that is what I aim to offer here. My basic proposal is that seeing o involves conscious acquaintance with o itself, the concrete worldly source of the truth that o is F, in a way that may make it evident to the subject that o is an instance of ‘x is F’ as she understands this, and hence evident that o is F. Seeing that o is F is thus a way of its being evident that o is F and is therefore a way of knowing that o is F. In Section 2, I set out the main lines of the account that I favour of the metaphysics of visual experience, of our seeing the particular worldly objects around us. Section 3 presents the core of the associated account of seeing, and hence knowing, that such things are the various ways that we can come to know that they are on the basis of

中文翻译:

感性经验与经验理性

有意识的经验在知觉知识的认识论中起什么作用?特别是,假设我看到面前的一个物体并因此知道它是红色或圆形的:我们如何准确地理解我看到那个东西对我的认知地位(相对于它的颜色或形状)的贡献?我根据 Williamson (2000, esp. ch. 1) 不加论证地假设,看到 o 是 F 是知道 o 是 F 的一种方式。我也理所当然地认为我们的直觉信念是在某些基本情况下看到 o是 F,主体将 o 本身视为认识 o 是 F 的情况,这一事实是他们认知状态不可或缺的一部分。我的问题是如何理解这一点:我们应该如何刻画看到 o 是 F 所发生的事情,在这种情况下,为了阐明看到 o 对他们作为知道 o 是 F 的情况的地位的贡献。 这不会涉及到在这种情况下看到 o 构成或有助于他们满足完全一般的知道的必要条件的想法o 是 F(参见 Williamson, 2000, ch. 1, and Roessler 2009)。尽管如此,还是有真正的解释和可理解性;这就是我在这里提供的目标。我的基本建议是,看到 o 涉及有意识地了解 o 本身,即 o 是 F 的具体世俗来源,以某种方式可以使主体明显看出 o 是“x 是 F”的一个实例,因为她理解这一点,因此很明显 o 是 F。因此,看到 o 是 F 是一种明显的方式 o 是 F,因此是一种知道 o 是 F 的方式。在第 2 节中,我列出了我喜欢视觉体验的形而上学的叙述的主要内容,我们看到了我们周围特定的世俗物体。第 3 节介绍了相关的观察和认识的核心,即这些事物是我们可以了解它们的各种方式,它们是基于
更新日期:2018-03-01
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