A sizable proportion of individuals act reciprocally. They punish and reward depending on the (un)kindness of those with whom they interact. In this paper, I explore whether individuals still reciprocate intentions when others lack full control over the consequences of their actions. By means of a dictator game with punishment opportunities, I show that unkind intentions are enough to trigger punishments, irrespectively of the outcome. By contrast, accidents are forgiven. To isolate how uncertainty over the result of an action affects the assessment of intentions, I control for other possible departures from self-profit maximization, such as distributional concerns or efficiency maximization. I find that the former also plays a role in respondents’ behavior.

相当一部分人相互行动。他们根据与他们互动的人的（不）善良来惩罚和奖励。在本文中，我探讨了当其他人无法完全控制自己的行动后果时，个人是否仍会回馈意图。通过具有惩罚机会的独裁者游戏，我证明了不怀好意的意图足以引发惩罚，而与结果无关。相比之下，事故是可以原谅的。为了隔离行动结果的不确定性如何影响意图评估，我控制了自利最大化的其他可能偏离，例如分配问题或效率最大化。我发现前者在受访者的行为中也起作用。