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The Hierarchy of Fregean Senses
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-11-12 , DOI: 10.1002/tht3.394
Ori Simchen 1
Affiliation  

The question whether Frege’s theory of indirect reference enforces an infinite hierarchy of senses has been hotly debated in the secondary literature. Perhaps the most influential treatment of the issue is that of Burge (1979), who offers an argument for the hierarchy from rather minimal Fregean assumptions. I argue that this argument, endorsed by many, does not itself enforce an infinite hierarchy of senses. I conclude that whether or not the theory of indirect reference can avail itself of only finitely many senses is pending further theoretical development. Consider the occurrence of ‘Opus 132 is a masterpiece’ in (1) Bela believes Opus 132 is a masterpiece and compare it with its occurrence in (2) Igor believes Bela believes Opus 132 is a masterpiece. Fregean doctrine tells us that in (1), ‘Opus 132 is a masterpiece’ refers to the ordinary sense of ‘Opus 132 is a masterpiece’, a mode of presentation of the truth-value of ‘Opus 132 is a masterpiece’ as it occurs unembedded, the thought that Opus 132 is a masterpiece. And the doctrine is often taken to suggest that in (2), ‘Opus 132 is a masterpiece’ refers to the sense of ‘Opus 132 is a masterpiece’ in (1), a mode of presentation of a mode of presentation of the truth-value of ‘Opus 132 is a masterpiece’ as it occurs unembedded, a mode of presentation of the thought that Opus 132 is a masterpiece. Question: Might the referent of ‘Opus 132 is a masterpiece’ in (2) be the same as the referent of ‘Opus 132 is a masterpiece’ in (1), namely, the thought that Opus 132 is a masterpiece? There is an influential argument due to Burge (1979) that is meant to show that it can’t be. For any expression α, let ‘α’ refer to the sense of α and assume for ∗To appear in Thought.

中文翻译:

弗雷格感官的层次

弗雷格的间接指称理论是否强制实施了无限的感官等级的问题在二级文献中引起了激烈的争论。也许对这个问题最有影响力的处理方法是 Burge (1979),他从相当少的 Fregean 假设中为层次结构提供了一个论据。我认为,这个被许多人认可的论点本身并没有强制执行无限的感官等级。我的结论是,间接指称理论是否只能利用有限的多种意义,有待进一步的理论发展。考虑在 (1) 贝拉认为作品 132 是杰作中出现的“作品 132 是杰作”,并将其与在 (2) 伊戈尔认为贝拉认为作品 132 是杰作中的发生进行比较。Fregean 学说告诉我们,在(1)中,“作品132是杰作”指的是普通意义上的“作品132是杰作”,是“作品132是杰作”的真值呈现方式,因为它是非嵌入的,认为作品132是一个杰作杰作。并且该学说经常被认为暗示在(2)中,“作品132是杰作”指的是(1)中的“作品132是杰作”的意义,一种呈现方式的呈现方式-“作品 132 是杰作”的价值,因为它未嵌入,这是作品 132 是杰作的思想的呈现方式。问:(2)中“作品132是杰作”的所指是否与(1)中“作品132是杰作”的所指相同,即认为作品132是杰作?Burge (1979) 提出了一个有影响力的论点,旨在表明它不可能。
更新日期:2018-11-12
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