Varela, Thompson, and Rosch illustrated their original presentation of the enactive theory of cognition with the example of a simple cellular automaton. Their theory was paradigmatically anti-computational, and yet automata similar to the one that they describe have typically been used to illustrate theories of computation, and are usually treated as abstract computational systems. Their use of this example is therefore puzzling, especially as they do not seem to acknowledge the discrepancy. The solution to this tension lies in recognizing a hidden background assumption, shared by both Varela, Thompson, and Rosch and the computational theories of mind which they were responding to. This assumption is that computation requires representation, and that computational states must bear representational content. For Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, representational content is incompatible with cognition, and so from their perspective the automaton that they describe cannot, despite appearances, be computational. However, there now exist several accounts of computation that do not make this assumption, and do not characterize computation in terms of representational content. In light of these recent developments, we will argue that it is quite straightforward to characterize the enactive automaton as a non-representational computing mechanism, one that we do not think they should have any objections to.

中文翻译：

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作为计算机制的生成自动机

Varela、Thompson 和 Rosch 以一个简单的元胞自动机为例，说明了他们对生成认知理论的原始介绍。他们的理论在范式上是反计算的，但与他们描述的类似的自动机通常被用来说明计算理论，并且通常被视为抽象的计算系统。因此，他们对这个例子的使用令人费解，尤其是因为他们似乎并不承认这种差异。解决这种紧张关系的方法在于认识到一个隐藏的背景假设，这是 Varela、Thompson 和 Rosch 以及他们所回应的心理计算理论所共有的。这个假设是计算需要表示，并且计算状态必须具有表示内容。对于瓦雷拉、汤普森和罗施，表征内容与认知不相容，因此从他们的角度来看，他们所描述的自动机尽管有外观，但不能是计算性的。然而，现在有几种计算方法没有做出这个假设，也没有根据表示内容来表征计算。鉴于这些最近的发展，我们将争辩说，将生成自动机描述为一种非代表性的计算机制是非常简单的，我们认为他们不应该反对这种机制。并且不根据表示内容来表征计算。鉴于这些最近的发展，我们将争辩说，将生成自动机描述为一种非代表性的计算机制是非常简单的，我们认为他们不应该反对这种机制。并且不根据表示内容来表征计算。鉴于这些最近的发展，我们将争辩说，将生成自动机描述为一种非代表性的计算机制是非常简单的，我们认为他们不应该反对这种机制。