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Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles
Philosophy & Public Affairs ( IF 2.200 ) Pub Date : 2017-03-01 , DOI: 10.1111/papa.12088
Derek Parfit

Suppose we discover how we could live for a thousand years, but in a way that made us unable to have children. Everyone chooses to live these long lives. After we all die, human history ends, since there would be no future people. Would that be bad? Would we have acted wrongly? Some pessimists would answer No. These people are saddened by the suffering in most people’s lives, and they believe it would be wrong to inflict such suffering on others by having children. In earlier centuries, this bleak view was fairly plausible. But our successors would be able to prevent most human suffering. Some optimists would also answer No. These people believe that most people’s lives are worth living. But they accept two Strong Narrow Person-Affecting Principles. On the Narrow Telic Principle:

中文翻译:

未来的人、非身份问题和影响人的原则

假设我们发现我们如何能活一千年,但以一种使我们无法生育的方式。每个人都选择过这样的长寿。我们都死了,人类的历史就结束了,因为没有未来的人。那会不会很糟糕?我们会不会做错事?一些悲观主义者会回答不。这些人对大多数人生活中的苦难感到悲伤,他们认为通过生孩子来给别人带来这种苦难是错误的。在更早的几个世纪,这种黯淡的观点是相当有道理的。但我们的继任者将能够避免大多数人类苦难。一些乐观主义者也会回答不。这些人认为大多数人的生活都值得一过。但他们接受两个严格的狭隘影响个人的原则。关于狭义 Telic 原则:
更新日期:2017-03-01
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