Automated decision making is becoming the norm across large parts of society, which raises interesting liability challenges when human control over technical systems becomes increasingly limited. This article defines "quasi-automation" as inclusion of humans as a basic rubber-stamping mechanism in an otherwise completely automated decision-making system. Three cases of quasi- automation are examined, where human agency in decision making is currently debatable: self- driving cars, border searches based on passenger name records, and content moderation on social media. While there are specific regulatory mechanisms for purely automated decision making, these regulatory mechanisms do not apply if human beings are (rubber-stamping) automated decisions. More broadly, most regulatory mechanisms follow a pattern of binary liability in attempting to regulate human or machine agency, rather than looking to regulate both. This results in regulatory gray areas where the regulatory mechanisms do not apply, harming human rights by preventing meaningful liability for socio-technical decision making. The article concludes by proposing criteria to ensure meaningful agency when humans are included in automated decision-making systems, and relates this to the ongoing debate on enabling human rights in Internet infrastructure.

中文翻译：

---

有责任，但不受控制吗？确保自动化决策系统中有意义的人为代理

自动化决策已成为社会上大部分地区的规范，当人们对技术系统的控制越来越有限时，这就提出了有趣的责任挑战。本文将“准自动化”定义为在完全自动化的决策系统中将人作为基本的橡皮图章机制。审查了三类准自动化案例，其中决策人员的代理机构目前值得商:：自动驾驶汽车，基于乘客姓名记录的边境搜索以及社交媒体上的内容审核。尽管存在用于纯自动化决策的特定监管机制，但是如果人类（橡皮图章）是自动化决策，则这些监管机制将不适用。更广泛地，大多数监管机制在尝试监管人或机器代理时都遵循二元责任模式，而不是试图同时监管两者。这导致不适用监管机制的监管灰色地带，通过防止对社会技术决策承担有意义的责任来损害人权。本文最后提出了一些标准，以确保将人包括在自动决策系统中时的有意义的代理权，并将其与正在进行的有关在互联网基础架构中实现人权的辩论相关。