According to substantivalism, spacetime points and regions are real entities whose existence is not dependent on matter. In this paper, I motivate and defend a version of substantivalism which takes the totality of spacetime as fundamental, and show how this position avoids certain problem cases, in particular the objection from static Leibniz shifts, and better conforms to how we think about space in physics. I argue that, even though the static Leibniz shifts do not show ordinary substantivalism is committed to in‐principle undetectable physical structure (pace Dasgupta (2015a)), they do indicate something problematic about the modal profile of space‐time and its constituents. While the problem is modal, the solution cannot be solely a matter of revising the substantivalist's modal claims. Rather, I argue, the substantivalist must revise her background ontology of space‐time. I show how this can be done by developing substantivalist theory that rejects this picture in favor of an alternative ontology of space‐time in the spirit of priority monism.

中文翻译：

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如何在不浮躁的情况下成为实质主义者*

根据实体主义，时空点和时区是真实的实体，其存在不依赖于物质。在本文中，我激励并捍卫了一种以实体主义为时空的基本形式的实体主义，并说明了这种立场是如何避免某些问题的发生，特别是静态莱布尼兹转变的反对，并更好地符合我们对空间中的空间的看法。物理。我认为，即使静态的莱布尼兹转移并没有表明普通的实体主义致力于原则上不可检测的物理结构（佩斯·达斯古普塔（Pace Dasgupta，2015a）），但它们的确表明了时空及其成分的模态特征存在一些问题。尽管问题是模态的，但解决方案不能仅是修改实体主义者的模态主张的问题。相反，我认为，实体主义者必须修改她的时空背景本体。我展示了如何通过发展实体主义理论来做到这一点，该理论拒绝了这幅画，而是以优先一元论的精神支持时空的另一种本体论。