Here I outline an often under‐appreciated position within Anglo‐analytic epistemology, that of the apostate to operative metaphilosophical constraints. To help identify and promote awareness of metaphilosophical apostacy, here, I describe the form of metaphilosophical apostacy that I practice in Anglo‐analytic epistemology (AAE). My apostasy with respect to AAE begins with significant, metaphilosophical divergences or deep senses of incongruence. A metaphilosophical divergence, on my account, refers to conflict at the level of inquiry‐shaping assumptions, constraints, aims, and/or commitments. In this paper, I claim that one way metaphilosophical apostasy emerges in Anglo‐analytic epistemology is when inquiry‐shaping divergences lead to conceptual indifference. Conceptual indifference, on my account, refers to disinterest that can follow from divergent metaphilosophical and/or aspirational aims and goals for one's favored investigations. To be clear, this is a paper for the growing population of epistemologists who find operative metaphilosophical constraints in AAE ill‐fitting.

中文翻译：

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背道者的故事

在这里，我概述了盎格鲁分析认识论中经常被低估的立场，即在操作上的元哲学约束下的背道者的立场。为了帮助识别和提升对超哲学的反叛意识，在这里，我描述了我在盎格鲁分析认识论（AAE）中实践的超哲学的反叛形式。我对AAE的背道始于重大的元哲学分歧或深刻的不一致。就我个人而言，一种超哲学的分歧是指在探究型假设，约束，目标和/或承诺层面上的冲突。在本文中，我主张在盎格鲁分析认识论中出现元哲学背叛的一种方式是，当问询形式的分歧导致概念上的冷漠时。就我而言，概念上的冷漠 指对一个人偏爱的研究可能因不同的元哲学和/或理想目标而产生的不感兴趣。需要明确的是，这是针对越来越多的认识论者群体的论文，他们发现在AAE不适合中存在操作性的元哲学约束。