This paper develops a normative account of epistemic luck, according to which the luckiness of epistemic luck is analyzed in terms of the expectations a subject is entitled to have when she satisfies the standards of epistemic justification. This account enables us to distinguish three types of epistemic luck—bad, good, and sheer—and to model the roles they play e.g. in Gettierization. One controversial aspect of the proposed account is that it is non‐reductive. While other approaches analyze epistemic luck in non‐epistemic terms—either in modal terms (lack of safety) or in agential terms (lack of creditworthiness)—I argue that the non‐reductive nature of the normative account is actually a selling‐point relative to its competitors.

中文翻译：

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认知运气的规范解释

本文建立了一个关于认知运气的规范性描述，根据该理论，对一个心理运气的运气进行了分析，并根据受试者满足认知合理性标准时有权获得的期望进行了分析。此说明使我们能够区分三种类型的认知运气–坏，好和纯粹–并模拟它们在Gettierization中所扮演的角色。拟议帐户的一个有争议的方面是它是非归约的。当其他方法以非流行的术语来分析认知运气时，无论是模态的（缺乏安全性）还是代理的（缺乏信用），我都认为规范账户的非归约性质实际上是一个相对的卖点。给它的竞争对手。