This study deals with the sceptical arguments by one of the most important figures in the philosophical Sufi tradition (the Akbarian school) and the foremost disciple of Ibn ʿArabī, Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī. Though not a sceptic in the strict sense, Qūnawī employs sceptical arguments from relativity of rational knowledge and disagreement among philosophers to prove inefficacy of reason and rational procedures of knowledge in terms of achieving certain knowledge of metaphysical matters, namely of God and the ultimate principles of things. The paper questions Qūnawī's implicit assumption that, if there is disagreement on a proposition p, then p is relative and thus cannot provide certain knowledge. It aims to philosophically analyse and assess his scepticism as well as to shed light on the largely unknown terrain of scepticism in the mediaeval Islamic world.

中文翻译：

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伊斯兰教中的阿克巴利怀疑主义：Qūnawī 从相对论和分歧中的怀疑论点

本研究探讨了苏菲派哲学传统（阿克巴里学派）中最重要的人物之一和伊本 ʿ 阿拉伯最重要的弟子 Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī 的怀疑论点。虽然不是严格意义上的怀疑论者，但 Qūnawī 运用理性知识的相对性和哲学家之间的分歧的怀疑论点来证明理性和理性的知识程序在获得对形而上学问题的某些知识方面的无效性，即关于上帝和终极原则的知识。事物。该论文质疑 Qūnawī 的隐含假设，即如果对命题p存在分歧，则p 是相对的，因此不能提供某些知识。它旨在从哲学上分析和评估他的怀疑主义，并阐明中世纪伊斯兰世界中很大程度上未知的怀疑主义领域。