What is the morally significant feature of discrimination? All of the following seem plausible – (i) discrimination is a kind of wrongdoing and it wrongs discriminatees, which is a matter of intrapersonal morality; (ii) in view of cases of indirect discrimination, significant normative features of discrimination are best captured in a discriminatee‐focused, or harm‐based, way; and (iii) discrimination, as an act‐type, necessarily involves interpersonal comparison. The first task of this article is to address which of intra‐ or interpersonal comparison is relevant to philosophical questions concerning discrimination. I submit that each of them has a place in the theory of discrimination; while interpersonal comparison is relevant in determining whether a differentiating act counts as discrimination, intrapersonal comparison is relevant in assessing whether it is morally wrong. The second task is to develop further a harm‐based answer to the latter question. My final proposal is as follows: discrimination is pro tanto morally wrong to the extent that it makes the discriminatees worse off than they would be were it not for the discrimination at issue, where one's well‐being is understood in terms of what one endorses in one's optimum form.

中文翻译：

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是什么使歧视在道德上是错误的？重新考虑了基于危害的视图

歧视在道德上的重要特征是什么？以下所有情况似乎都是合理的：（i）歧视是一种错误的行为，它是对错误的歧视，这是个人内部道德的问题；（ii）考虑到间接歧视的情况，最好以歧视为重点或基于伤害的方式来体现歧视的重要规范特征；（iii）歧视作为一种行为类型，必然涉及人际交往比较。本文的首要任务是解决人际或人际比较中哪些与歧视相关的哲学问题有关。我认为，他们每个人在歧视理论中都占有一席之地。人际比较在确定差异行为是否被视为歧视时是相关的，人际比较在评估其在道德上是否错误时是相关的。第二项任务是针对后一个问题进一步发展基于伤害的答案。我最后的建议是：歧视是亲TANTO不道德的行为在某种程度上，它使更糟的discriminatees比他们会，如果不是在问题中，辨别其中一个的福祉是在什么人赞同的来理解一个人的最佳形式。