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Conceptualism and Concept Acquisition
Theoria Pub Date : 2019-10-18 , DOI: 10.1111/theo.12209
Blake McAllister 1
Affiliation  

Many think that the perceptual theory known as “conceptualism” cannot honour a common and intuitive constraint on concept acquisition – that we gain the initial power to deploy primitive concepts through experience. Their argument is: if experience involves the deployment of concepts, then one must possess the power to deploy those concepts prior to experience. I argue that the plausibility of this argument rests on a subtle equivocation. It is true that conceptualism requires a particular kind of power to deploy concepts prior to experience, but not the sort referenced in the intuitive constraint mentioned above. I end by proposing how the conceptualist might satisfy this constraint. I conclude that conceptualism is better situated to account for primitive concept acquisition than typically thought.

中文翻译:

概念主义与概念习得

许多人认为,被称为“概念主义”的感知理论无法兑现对概念获取的普遍且直观的约束,即我们获得了通过经验来部署原始概念的初始能力。他们的观点是:如果经验涉及概念的部署,那么人们必须具备在经历之前部署这些概念的能力。我认为,这种论证的合理性基于一个微妙的模棱两可。的确,概念主义需要一种特殊的东西。在体验之前部署概念的能力,但没有上述直觉约束中提到的排序。最后,我提出了概念主义者如何满足这一约束的要求。我得出的结论是,概念主义比通常的思想更能说明原始概念的获得。
更新日期:2019-10-18
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