It is widely agreed that there is a rational requirement, “Enkrasia”, which requires that you intend what you believe you ought to do. This paper argues that Enkrasia is not an independent requirement of practical rationality: it is a special case of the requirement to be instrumentally rational. I argue for this view of Enkrasia through an analysis of an all‐things‐considered belief about what you ought to do. Believing, all‐thing‐considered, that you ought to φ implies being settled on a set of options from which to take an option. I argue that this state of being settled on a set of options cannot be a matter of believing. Rather, it should be understood as intending that you do what you ought to do out of that set. If an all‐things‐considered belief implies such an intention, however, satisfying Enkrasia is a matter of satisfying the requirement to intend a necessary means to an end that you intend.

中文翻译：

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追求理性就是工具理性*

人们普遍同意，有一个合理的要求“ Enkrasia”，即要求您打算自己认为应该做的事情。本文认为，英语不是实践理性的独立要求：它是工具理性要求的特例。我通过对您应该做的事情的全面分析来支持这种对乌克兰的看法。全面考虑，您应该相信φ意味着要确定要从中获得期权的一组期权。我认为，这种基于一系列选择的解决方案的状态不可能是一个相信的问题。相反，应该理解为打算在该组之外执行您应做的事情。但是，如果万事俱备的信念意味着这样的意图，那么满足Enkrasia就是满足为达到目的而必须采取必要手段的要求。