1 INTRODUCTION

We believe that the ordinary physical objects that we perceive continue to exist unperceived; and this is intuitively an aspect of any authentic characterization of how the world appears to us in perception.¹1 I elaborate this intuitive starting point more fully in section 2 below.
Yet Hume argues that the belief in continued existence unperceived cannot have its source in perception alone (Hume, 1978, I.4.ii). Evans offers a proposal about how to understand the way in which its objects’ existence unperceived may indeed be an aspect of our perception that has in one way or another been involved in most of the developed accounts of perceptual objectivity (Evans, 1985). I elaborate these ideas and arguments before considering various ways that Evans's proposal may be implemented. I argue that those currently on offer face serious objections before sketching my own alternative implementation and giving some indication of its virtues. Its key is to allow, in addition to the perceptual evidence grounded in the objects and properties that a person is acquainted with in any particular perceptual experience, also for a kind of formal perceptual evidence grounded in the way in which she is acquainted with such things in any experience.²2 Much of the argument here is developed in greater detail and extent in my forthcoming book, The Objectivity of Perception (Brewer, forthcoming).

中文翻译：

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感知不到的持续存在

1引言

我们相信，我们感知到的普通物理对象仍然存在，并且未被感知；从直觉上讲，这是对世界在感知中如何呈现给我们的任何真实表征的一个方面。^1个1我将在下面的第2部分中更详细地阐述这个直观的起点。
然而，休argue认为，对持续存在的信念没有被感知就不能仅凭感知来产生其根源（休ume ，1978，I.4.ii）。埃文斯（Evans）提出了一个关于如何理解其物体的存在未被感知的方式的建议，这可能确实是我们的感知的一个方面，这种感知已经以某种方式参与了大多数已发展的感知客观性的解释（Evans，1985年）。）。在考虑可以实施埃文斯提案的各种方式之前，我先详细阐述了这些想法和观点。我认为，目前提供这些建议的人在草拟我自己的替代实现方案并给出其优点的一些指示之前会面临严重的异议。它的关键是，除了以某人在任何特定的感知经验中熟悉的事物和特性为基础的感知证据之外，还允许以其熟悉此类事物的方式为基础的某种形式的感知证据在任何经验中。²2在我即将出版的《知觉的客观性》（布鲁尔，即将出版）一书中，这里的许多论点都得到了更详细和广泛的论述。