Many philosophers take experience to be an essential aspect of perceptual justification. I argue against a specific variety of such an experientialist view, namely, the Looks View of perceptual justification, according to which our visual beliefs are mediately justified by beliefs about the way things look. I describe three types of cases that put pressure on the idea that perceptual justification is always related to looks‐related reasons: unsophisticated cognizers, multimodal identification, and amodal completion. I then provide a tentative diagnosis of what goes wrong in the Looks View: it ascribes a specific epistemic role to beliefs about looks that is actually fulfilled by subpersonal perceptual processes.

中文翻译：

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外观构成我们的感知证据吗？

许多哲学家将经验视为感知辩护的重要方面。我反对这种经验主义观点的特定变体，即知觉辩护的外观视图，根据这种观点，我们的视觉信念被关于事物外观的信念作为中介来辩护。我描述了三种类型的案例，这些案例对知觉辩护总是与与外观相关的原因有关的观念施加了压力：不成熟的认知者，多模态识别和无模态完成。然后，我对“外观”视图中出了什么问题进行了初步诊断：它将特定的认知作用归因于对个人外观的认知，这些信念实际上是由个人下的知觉过程实现的。