1 INTRODUCTION

This paper is about internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat. It has three aims. The first is to develop an argument against internalism to the effect that the correct epistemology of defeat must be externalist (Section 1). The second is to show that cases involving defeat also cause trouble for phenomenal conservatism (Sections 2 and 3). The third is to cast doubt on the idea that phenomenal conservatism might work as a specific thesis about the status of seemings of particular kinds as justifiers. In particular, I will ask whether perceptual seemings might still be justifiers and provide some reason for pessimism (Section 4).

中文翻译：

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内在主义，惊人的保守主义和失败

1引言

本文是关于内在主义，惊人的保守主义和失败的。它有三个目标。第一个是提出反对内部主义的论据，以至于失败的正确认识论必须是外在主义的（第1节）。第二个目的是表明涉及失败的案件也给惊人的保守主义带来麻烦（第2节和第3节）。第三是怀疑现象的保守主义可能是关于特定种类的表象作为证明者的地位的具体论断的观点。我特别要问的是，感性表象是否仍可能是合理的，并为悲观主义提供了一些理由（第4节）。