This paper makes a theoretical innovation by integrating two key principles – mutual forbearance and the principle of congruity – into one general process model. It examines the micro‐mechanisms underlying the formation of a mutual‐forbearance agreement and explicates the role of time and of individual actions. We further understanding of the process of cooperation building by drawing a parallel between early stages of the formation process of mutual forbearance and cooperation, and argue that mutual forbearance may, under certain conditions, lead to long‐term cooperation or, if mismanaged, completely smother any chances of it. A prospective agreement may be put at risk when potential contributions are evaluated differently by each party and no action to mitigate the consequences is taken; even more so in a mutual‐forbearance context when the parties can only observe their counterparts’ actions through the market. Our model takes into account the micro‐mechanisms associated with the time between the actions of one entity/individual (e.g. the top manager) and the reaction of another entity/individual, the boundary conditions of the background to those actions and the alternative actions available during this time. Propositions for further exploration and implications are drawn.

中文翻译：

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了解公司间合作的基础过程：相互宽容和一致原则

本文通过将两个主要原则（相互容忍和全等原则）整合到一个通用过程模型中，进行了理论上的创新。它研究了形成相互宽容协议的基础的微观机制，并阐明了时间和个人行为的作用。我们通过在相互容忍与合作的形成过程的早期阶段之间取得平行来进一步了解合作建立的过程，并指出，相互容忍在某些条件下可能导致长期合作，或者如果管理不当，则会完全窒息。任何机会。如果各方对潜在贡献的评估方式不同，并且未采取任何措施来减轻后果，则可能会导致预期协议处于风险之中；当双方只能通过市场观察其同行的行为时，在相互宽容的情况下尤其如此。我们的模型考虑了与一个实体/个人（例如，最高管理者）的动作与另一实体/个人的反应之间的时间相关的微观机制，这些动作的背景边界条件以及可用的替代动作在这段时间。提出了进一步探索和暗示的建议。这些动作的背景边界条件以及这段时间内可用的替代动作。提出了进一步探索和暗示的建议。这些动作的背景边界条件以及这段时间内可用的替代动作。提出了进一步探索和暗示的建议。