The concept of unprejudiced beliefs equilibrium is simple: out-of-equilibrium beliefs should be consistent with the principle that multiple deviations are infinitely less likely than single deviations. Our questions are: does there always exist such an equilibrium and what can be done if there are multiple such equilibria?

To select a unique equilibrium, this notion is usually coupled with the intuitive criterion. The simultaneous usage of these concepts is ad hoc, unjustified, and again might eliminate all the equilibria.

We show that coupling these notions is legitimate, as both are implied by strategic stability (Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)), hence a desired equilibrium always exists. The intuitive criterion is trivially implied by stability. We show that in generic multi-sender signaling games stable outcomes can be supported with unprejudiced beliefs. It follows by forward induction that stable sets contain an equilibrium which is unprejudiced and intuitive at the same time.

不受偏见的信念均衡的概念很简单：不均衡信念应符合以下原则：多重偏差比单一偏差的可能性无限小。我们的问题是：是否总是存在这样的平衡？如果存在多个这样的平衡，该怎么办？

为了选择一个独特的平衡，这个概念通常与直观的标准结合在一起。这些概念的同时使用是临时的，不合理的，并且可能再次消除所有的平衡。

我们证明耦合这些概念是合理的，因为战略稳定性暗示了两者（Kohlberg and Mertens（1986）），因此总是存在理想的平衡。直观性的标准是稳定性所隐含的。我们表明，在通用的多发送者信号游戏中，稳定的结果可以用不偏不倚的信念来支持。通过前向归纳法可以得出，稳定集包含同时不受偏见和直观影响的平衡。