Scholars disagree on how the law should respond to conscientious objections. Among these scholars, some have cast their arguments in terms of tolerance and respect. Yossi Nehushtan for instance favours the lens of tolerance, while John Olusegun Adenitire, among others, favours the contrasting lens of respect. In this article, I argue that we need both lenses – tolerance and respect – to make sense of how constitutional democracies (ought to) respond to conscientious objections. I begin by proposing a normative-conceptual argument, in which I map the contrasting lenses of respect and tolerance onto the distinction between ‘standard’ and ‘complicity-based’ claims of conscience. I explain the argument with reference to conscientious objection to paying taxes, to military service, to abortion and to same-sex marriage. I then complicate the normative argument by discussing diverging legal responses to claims of conscience across less familiar constitutional democracies (Singapore, South Korea, Colombia, Sweden, Italy, South Africa and the Netherlands). I conclude by proposing that, quite separate from any normative disagreement, there is a pragmatic baseline that delineates the practical realm of possibilities.

中文翻译：

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通过宽容和尊重的对比镜头的良心反对

学者们对法律应如何回应出于良心的反对意见不一。在这些学者中，有些人从宽容和尊重的角度提出了他们的论点。例如，Yossi Nehushtan 偏爱宽容的镜头，而 John Olusegun Adenitire 等则偏爱对比鲜明的尊重镜头。在这篇文章中，我认为我们需要两个视角——宽容和尊重——来理解宪政民主（应该）如何回应出于良心的反对。我首先提出一个规范性概念论点，在其中我将尊重和宽容的对比镜头映射到“标准”和“基于共谋”的良心主张之间的区别。我根据出于良心拒绝纳税、服兵役、堕胎和同性婚姻来解释这个论点。然后，我通过讨论在不太熟悉的宪政民主国家（新加坡、韩国、哥伦比亚、瑞典、意大利、南非和荷兰）对良心主张的不同法律回应，使规范论点复杂化。我最后提出，与任何规范性分歧完全不同的是，有一个务实的基线来描述可能性的实际领域。