What do border guards and central bankers have in common? Both operate, on a day-to-day basis, in political spaces exempt from many of the norms of liberal democratic politics and yet have the power to define and constrain them. In order to understand the role of such routine suspensions in the norms of liberal politics, we need to move beyond analyses that focus narrowly on security exceptionalism or emergency-management and pay attention to the practices of technocratic exceptionalism. Drawing on Foucault’s lectures on biopolitics, I examine the ways in which economic theory and practice has sought to resolve some of the central tensions in liberalism by protecting the market from too much democracy—a kind of exceptionalism exemplified by the doctrine of central bank independence.

中文翻译：

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技术官僚的例外主义：货币政策与对民主的恐惧

边防军和中央银行家有什么共同点？两者每天都在不受许多自由民主政治规范约束的政治空间中运作，但仍有权力对其进行定义和约束。为了理解这种例行中止在自由主义政治规范中的作用，我们需要超越仅侧重于安全例外论或紧急情况管理的分析，而要注意技术官僚例外论的实践。在福柯关于生物政治学的演讲中，我考察了经济理论和实践试图通过保护市场免受过多民主的影响来解决自由主义的一些中央紧张局势的方式，这种例外主义以中央银行独立主义为例。