Theories of ethics that attempt to incorporate divine speech or commands as necessary elements in the construction of moral obligations are often viewed as vulnerable to a challenge based on the so-called Euthyphro dilemma. According to this challenge, opponents of theistic ethics suppose that divine speech either informs one of a preexisting set of values and obligations, which makes it inconsequential, or is entirely arbitrary, which makes it irrational. This essay analyzes some of the debates on the nature of divine commands in eleventh-century works of Islamic jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). I show that Muʿtazilī jurisprudents advanced the view that divine commands were actions performed in time that had concrete manifestations, while Ashʿarīs argued that divine speech in general, and commands in particular, were eternal divine attributes. After exposing certain weaknesses in the Euthyphro-inspired objections to theistic ethics, I argue that the Ashʿarī idea of commands as divine attributes is a promising move for scholars interested in defending a divine command view of moral obligation.

中文翻译：

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命令作为神圣属性

试图将神圣的话语或命令作为构建道德义务的必要元素的伦理学理论通常被视为容易受到基于所谓的 Euthyphro 困境的挑战。根据这一挑战，有神论伦理的反对者认为，神圣的言论要么告知了一套预先存在的价值观和义务中的一个，这使得它无关紧要，要么完全武断，使其变得不合理。本文分析了 11 世纪伊斯兰法学著作 (uṣūl al-fiqh) 中关于神谕性质的一些争论。我表明 Muʿtazilī 法理学提出了这样的观点，即神圣的命令是在时间上执行的具有具体表现的行为，而 Ashʿarīs 则认为一般的神圣言论，特别是命令，是永恒的神圣属性。