In this paper I challenge the orthodox view of the significance of Platonic value problems. According to this view, such problems are among the central questions of epistemology, and answering them is essential for justifying the status of epistemology as a major branch of philosophical enquiry. I challenge this view by identifying an assumption on which Platonic value problems are based – the value assumption – and considering how this assumption might be resisted. After articulating a line of thought that supports the assumption, I highlight one way of undermining it, which is to deny that we desire knowledge and not just (e.g.) true belief because we prefer knowledge to true belief. I then consider an attempt to undermine the value assumption in this way, inspired by Bernard Williams. I contend that Williams's argument fails, but also that seeing why it fails is instructive for future attempts to resist the value assumption.

中文翻译：

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探究与知识的价值

在本文中，我挑战了关于柏拉图价值问题重要性的正统观点。根据这种观点，这些问题属于认识论的核心问题，回答这些问题对于证明认识论作为哲学研究的一个主要分支的地位是必不可少的。我通过确定柏拉图价值问题所基于的假设——价值假设——并考虑如何抵制这种假设来挑战这一观点。在阐明了支持该假设的思路之后，我强调了一种破坏它的方式，即否认我们欲望知识而不仅仅是（例如）真正的信念，因为我们更喜欢知识到真实的信念。然后，我考虑以这种方式破坏价值假设的尝试，受伯纳德·威廉姆斯的启发。我认为威廉姆斯的论证失败了，但也认为了解它失败的原因对于未来抵制价值假设的尝试具有指导意义。