In recent years there has been a general attempt – inspired by P. F. Strawson – to naturalise Kant's notion of the transcendental self. The argument being that self-consciousness should refer to neither a kind of noumenal nor mental self but that the self-conscious subject must conceive of itself as an embodied entity, a person among persons that regards itself as an element of the objective order of the world. While Kant does not make room for the notion of an embodied transcendental self, this is where we need to go as our bodily awareness is central both for self-knowledge and the possibility of cognition and thus a transcendental condition for knowledge claims. In this paper I should like to single out Quassim Cassam's work Self and World to see whether such a position is tenable. Cassam's main claim is that we can only become aware of ourselves as subjects if we are at the very same time aware of ourselves as objects located in the spatio-temporal world. We could not be self-conscious and ascribe experiences to ourselves unless we are also aware of ourselves as a physical object among other physical objects in the world. The central claim is that when we self-refer we do not refer to two distinct entities, one possessing only mental, and the other possessing only physical features, rather we refer to a subject that is both mental and physical at the very same time. Awareness of ourselves qua subject is just awareness of ourselves qua object. This paper will focus on this claim alone and will ask whether it is tenable. The answer will be negative. Drawing on the work of Edmund Husserl, I shall argue that there is an inherent flaw in Cassam's position which he has inherited from Gareth Evans’ depiction of the self. The contention will be that our awareness of ourselves qua subject is not compatible with the awareness of ourselves qua object.

中文翻译：

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体现和自我意识——埃文斯、卡萨姆和胡塞尔

近年来，受到 PF Strawson 的启发，人们普遍尝试将康德的先验自我概念自然化。其论点是，自我意识既不应该指一种本体的自我，也不能指心理的自我，而是自我意识的主体必须把自己想象成一个具身的实体，一个把自己看作是客观秩序的一个要素的人。世界。虽然康德没有为具身的先验自我的概念腾出空间，但这是我们需要去的地方，因为我们的身体意识是自我认识和认知可能性的核心，因此是知识主张的先验条件。在这篇论文中，我想特别提到 Quassim Cassam 的工作自我与世界看看这样的立场是否站得住脚。卡萨姆的主要主张是，只有当我们同时意识到自己是位于时空世界中的客体时，我们才能意识到自己是主体。除非我们也意识到自己是世界上其他物理对象中的一个物理对象，否则我们不可能有自我意识并将经验归因于自己。核心主张是，当我们自我指涉时，我们指的不是两个不同的实体，一个仅具有精神特征，另一个仅具有物理特征，而是指一个既是精神又是物理的主体同时. 对我们自己的认识夸主题只是自我意识夸目的。本文将只关注这一主张，并将询问它是否成立。答案是否定的。借鉴埃德蒙·胡塞尔的著作，我将论证卡萨姆的立场存在一个内在缺陷，他继承了加雷斯·埃文斯对自我的描述。争论将是我们对自己的认识夸主题与我们自己的意识不相容夸目的。