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An Attitude Towards an Artificial Soul? Responses to the “Nazi Chatbot”
Philosophical Investigations Pub Date : 2017-09-14 , DOI: 10.1111/phin.12173
Ondřej Beran 1
Affiliation  

The article discusses the case of Microsoft's Twitter chatbot Tay that “turned into a Nazi” after less than 24 hours from its release on the Internet. The first section presents a brief recapitulation of Alan Turing's proposal for a test for artificial intelligence and the way it influenced subsequent discussions in the philosophy of mind. In the second section, I offer a few arguments appealing for caution regarding the identification of an accomplished chatbot as a thinking being. These are motivated principally by Ludwig Wittgenstein's discussions of mind and soul and by some Wittgensteinian philosophers' criticisms of AI endeavours. I will try to show that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to make sense of AIs such as chatbots as thinking beings, rather independently of their technical perfection and accomplishment. In the third section, the case of the “Nazi chatbot” Tay will offer me material for some light to be shed on the peculiar (primitive) character of our interconnected concepts of thinking, soul and person and on the importance of their further ramified connections.

中文翻译:

对人造灵魂的态度?对“纳粹聊天机器人”的回应

本文讨论了Microsoft的Twitter聊天机器人Tay在互联网发布不到24小时后“变成纳粹”的案例。第一部分简要概述了艾伦·图灵(Alan Turing)提出的人工智能测试提案,以及该提案如何影响心智哲学随后的讨论。在第二部分中,我提供了一些论点,呼吁人们谨慎对待将已完成的聊天机器人识别为一种思想个体。这些主要是由路德维希·维特根斯坦(Ludwig Wittgenstein)对思想和灵魂的讨论以及一些维特根斯坦哲学家对AI努力的批评所激发的。我将尝试表明,即使不是不可能,也很难将像聊天机器人这样的AI理解为有思想的人,而不是依赖于其技术上的完善和成就。
更新日期:2017-09-14
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