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Pritchard Versus Pritchard on Luck
Metaphilosophy Pub Date : 2019-01-01 , DOI: 10.1111/meta.12341
Job De Grefte 1
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This paper argues for a particular account of luck by comparing two distinct versions of the modal account of luck that have been provided by Duncan Pritchard (2005, 2014). More specifically, it argues that there are three respects in which Pritchard's earlier modal account of luck is preferable to his later account: it accounts better for the fact that luck comes in degrees, it includes a significance condition, and it better acknowledges the subjective nature of luck. The paper then discusses two consequences of the points it makes for epistemology: an alleged pragmatic encroachment, and a particular view on the relation between knowledge, luck, and justification.

中文翻译:

普里查德与普里查德的运气

本文通过比较 Duncan Pritchard (2005, 2014) 提供的两种不同版本的运气模态解释来论证对运气的特殊解释。更具体地说,它认为普里查德早期对运气的模态解释在三个方面比他后来的解释更可取:它更好地解释了运气是有度数的事实,它包含了一个显着性条件,它更好地承认了主观性运气。然后,该论文讨论了它对认识论提出的观点的两个后果:所谓的实用主义侵犯,以及对知识、运气和理由之间关系的特殊看法。
更新日期:2019-01-01
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