Scott Forschler defends R. M. Hare's rationalist-universalizing-utilitarian moral approach against Jens Timmermann's critique of it. He argues that Timmermann fails to see that Kant's ethical rationalism might be consistent with utilitarianism, and argues that Timmermann merely assumes that Kant's deontology follows logically from his ethical rationalism. In Forschler's estimation, it has not been established that either Kant's or Hare's ethical rationalism is inconsistent with utilitarianism. This article, however, argues that, in his response to Timmermann on behalf of Hare's rationalist-universalizing-utilitarian approach, Forschler has overlooked something very significant at the foundational level of Hare's moral approach, and that this oversight undercuts his response to Timmermann. The analysis also invites a metaethical investigation of preference satisfaction as it is found in Hare's moral approach. The article uncovers some fundamental metaethical presuppositions in Hare's normative approach, presuppositions overlooked by Forschler.

中文翻译：

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蒂默曼、福施勒和弥合康德-后果主义鸿沟的尝试

Scott Forschler 为 RM Hare 的理性主义-普遍化-功利主义道德方法辩护，反对 Jens Timmermann 对其的批评。他认为蒂默曼没有看到康德的伦理理性主义可能与功利主义相一致，并且认为蒂默曼只是假设康德的道义论从他的伦理理性主义逻辑上遵循。在福施勒的估计中，康德或黑尔的伦理理性主义与功利主义不一致这一点尚未得到证实。然而，本文认为，在代表 Hare 的理性主义-普遍化-功利主义方法对 Timmermann 的回应中，Forschler 忽略了 Hare 道德方法的基础层面上非常重要的一些东西，并且这种疏忽削弱了他对 Timmermann 的回应。该分析还邀请了对偏好满意度的元伦理学调查，正如在 Hare 的道德方法中发现的那样。这篇文章揭示了 Hare 规范方法中的一些基本元伦理学预设，这些预设被 Forschler 所忽视。