In §76 of the third Critique, Kant claims that an intuitive understanding would represent no distinction between possible and actual things. Prior interpretations of §76 take Kant to claim that an intuitive understanding would produce things merely in virtue of thinking about them and, thus, could not think of merely possible things. In contrast, I argue that §76’s modal claims hinge on Kant’s suggestion that God represents things in their thoroughgoing determination, including in their connection to God’s actual will. I conclude by using my interpretation to argue that §76’s modal claims do not entail Spinozism.

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康德关于上帝的直觉理解：解释 CJ §76 的模态主张

在第三节第 76 节批判，康德声称，直觉的理解不会代表可能事物和实际事物之间的区别。对第 76 条的先前解释使康德声称，直觉的理解将仅仅凭借对事物的思考而产生事物，因此，不能仅想到可能的事物。相比之下，我认为 §76 的模态主张取决于康德的建议，即上帝代表事物的彻底决定，包括与上帝实际旨意的联系。最后，我用我的解释来论证 §76 的模态主张并不包含斯宾诺莎主义。