Phenomenalist interpretations of Kant are out of fashion. The most common complaint from anti-phenomenalist critics is that a phenomenalist reading of Kant would collapse Kantian idealism into Berkeleyan idealism. This would be unacceptable because Berkeleyan idealism is incompatible with core elements of Kant’s empirical realism. In this paper, I argue that not all phenomenalist readings threaten empirical realism. First, I distinguish several variants of phenomenalism, and then show that Berkeley’s idealism is characterized by his commitment to most of them. I then make the case that two forms of phenomenalism are consistent with Kant’s empirical realism. The comparison between Kant and Berkeley runs throughout the paper, with special emphasis on the significance of their theories of intentionality.

中文翻译：

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没有伯克利唯心主义的康德现象主义

对康德的现象主义解释已经过时了。反现象主义批评家最常见的抱怨是，对康德的现象主义解读会将康德唯心主义瓦解为伯克利唯心主义。这是不可接受的，因为伯克利的唯心主义与康德的经验实在论的核心要素不相容。在本文中，我认为并非所有现象主义解读都威胁到经验实在论。首先，我区分了现象主义的几种变体，然后表明伯克利的唯心主义的特点是他对其中大多数的承诺。然后我提出两种形式的现象主义与康德的经验实在论是一致的。康德和伯克利之间的比较贯穿整篇论文，特别强调了他们的意向性理论的重要性。