AbstractThis paper resolves the problems raised by Israel Scheffler and Noam Chomsky against Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. I call Scheffler’s and Chomsky’s problems as (1) the problem of inexorable ontological commitments and (2) the problem of false existential inferences. I extend their problems to a third one, which is called as the problem of extended inexorable ontological commitments to rival entities. In order to present the third problem, two ontological disputes are considered: Russell–Meinong dispute from the context of the referential theory of meaning and David Lewis–Meinong dispute from the context of modal metaphysics. In order to work out a resolution to these three problems, I emphasize the distinction between meta-ontology/meta-theory and object theory. Then, it is explained that there is a functional difference between Quine’s criterion of ontological commitments (meta-theory) and the object theories to which this criterion is applied. Here, considering the functional difference, I introduce different kinds of commitments: direct commitments and indirect commitments. Using Strawson’s views on the notion of presupposition, the distinction between direct commitments and indirect commitments is characterized further. Employing this distinction, I resolve the problem of inexorable ontological commitment to the entities, the problem of false existential inferences and the problems of extended inexorable ontological commitment to the rival entities.

中文翻译：

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解决谢因和乔姆斯基关于奎因本体论准则的问题

摘要：本文解决了以色列谢弗勒和诺姆·乔姆斯基针对奎因的本体论承诺标准提出的问题。我称谢弗勒和乔姆斯基的问题为（1）不可抗拒的本体论承诺问题，（2）错误的存在推断问题。我将他们的问题扩展到第三个问题，这被称为对竞争实体扩展不可逾越的本体论承诺的问题。为了提出第三个问题，考虑了两个本体论上的争论：从指称意义理论的上下文中的罗素-梅农之争和从模态形而上学的大卫·刘易斯-梅农之争。为了解决这三个问题，我强调了元本体论/元理论与对象理论之间的区别。然后，据解释，奎因的本体论承诺标准（元理论）与该标准所适用的客体理论之间存在功能上的差异。在这里，考虑到功能上的差异，我介绍了不同种类的承诺：直接承诺和间接承诺。使用斯特劳森对预设概念的看法，进一步明确了直接承诺和间接承诺之间的区别。通过这种区别，我解决了对实体的不可逾越的本体论承诺，错误的存在推断和对竞争实体扩展不可逾越的本体论承诺的问题。考虑到功能上的差异，我介绍了不同种类的承诺：直接承诺和间接承诺。使用斯特劳森对预设概念的看法，进一步明确了直接承诺和间接承诺之间的区别。通过这种区别，我解决了对实体的不可逾越的本体论承诺，错误的存在推断以及对竞争实体扩展不可逾越的本体论承诺的问题。考虑到功能上的差异，我介绍了不同种类的承诺：直接承诺和间接承诺。使用斯特劳森对预设概念的看法，进一步明确了直接承诺和间接承诺之间的区别。通过这种区别，我解决了对实体的不可逾越的本体论承诺，错误的存在推断以及对竞争实体扩展不可逾越的本体论承诺的问题。