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Unconscious Pleasures and Pains: A Problem for Attitudinal Theories?
Utilitas Pub Date : 2018-04-02 , DOI: 10.1017/s0953820818000109
FRED FELDMAN

Ben Bramble, Dan Haybron and others have endorsed the idea that there are unconscious, or unfelt, pleasures and pains. These would be sensory experiences that are genuine pleasures or pains, but experiences of which the subject is unaware. The idea that there are such things is worthy of attention in its own right; but I am interested in this alleged phenomenon for a further reason. I am attracted to an attitudinal theory of sensory pleasure and pain. Bramble has claimed that the existence of unconscious pleasures and pains reveals that attitudinal theories cannot be true. Chris Heathwood has offered a reply on behalf of attitudinalism. I think a better reply can be provided. In this article I explain why an attitudinal theory of pleasure and pain is consistent with whatever is plausible in the ‘unconscious pleasure and pain’ phenomenon.

中文翻译:

无意识的快乐和痛苦:态度理论的问题?

Ben Bramble、Dan Haybron 和其他人赞同存在无意识或无感觉的快乐和痛苦的观点。这些将是真正的快乐或痛苦的感官体验,但受试者没有意识到这些体验。存在这样的事情的想法本身就值得关注。但我对这种所谓的现象感兴趣还有一个原因。我被感官愉悦和痛苦的态度理论所吸引。布兰布尔声称,无意识的快乐和痛苦的存在表明态度理论不可能是真的。Chris Heathwood 代表态度主义给出了答复。我认为可以提供更好的答复。在这篇文章中,我解释了为什么一种关于快乐和痛苦的态度理论与“无意识的快乐和痛苦”现象中任何合理的东西是一致的。
更新日期:2018-04-02
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