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The Aptness of Anger
Journal of Political Philosophy ( IF 1.881 ) Pub Date : 2017-07-09 , DOI: 10.1111/jopp.12130
Amia Srinivasan 1
Affiliation  

ABSTRACT: A long philosophical and political tradition holds that victims of injustice ought not get angry because doing so would be counterproductive. But this tradition neglects the possibility that anger might be counterproductive and yet apt. What ought a victim of injustice do when her anger would worsen her situation but nonetheless be a fitting response to the state of the world? Here reasons of prudence and reasons of aptness come apart, generating, I argue, a substantive normative conflict. Two things, I suggest, follow. First, the counterproductivity critic faces the burden of explaining why, in such conflicts, prudential considerations trump considerations of aptness; until this burden is met, there is no obvious inference to be made from the counterproductivity of one’s anger to an all-things-considered prohibition on one’s getting angry. Second, it’s plausible that such conflicts – where victims of oppression must choose between getting aptly angry or acting prudentially – themselves constitute a form of unrecognised injustice, what I call affective injustice. I conclude by discussing the prospects for alleviating affective injustice in the political sphere, and offering a diagnosis of our reluctance to make room, in our politics, for anger.

中文翻译:

愤怒的适应性

摘要:一个悠久的哲学和政治传统认为,不公正的受害者不应该生气,因为这样做会适得其反。但这种传统忽略了愤怒可能适得其反但又适得其反的可能性。如果不公正的受害者的愤怒会使她的处境恶化,但仍然是对世界状况的恰当回应,她应该怎么做?在这里,谨慎的理由和适当的理由分开,我认为,产生了实质性的规范冲突。我建议遵循两件事。首先,适得其反的批评者面临着解释为什么在这种冲突中审慎考虑胜过适当考虑的负担;直到这个负担得到满足,没有明显的推论可以从一个人的愤怒的反作用到全面考虑禁止一个人的生气。其次,这种冲突——压迫的受害者必须在适当生气或谨慎行事之间做出选择——本身构成了一种未被承认的不公正形式,我称之为情感不公正,这似乎是合理的。最后,我讨论了减轻政治领域情感不公正的前景,并诊断出我们不愿意在我们的政治中为愤怒腾出空间。
更新日期:2017-07-09
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