Despite historic increases in crime and violence, Latin America’s police forces are characterized by long periods of institutional weakness punctuated by rare, sweeping reforms. To understand these patterns of institutional continuity and change, the author applies the concept of structural power, demonstrating how police leverage their control of coercion to constrain the policy options available to politicians. Within this constrained policy space, politicians choosing between continuity and reform assess societal preferences for police reform and patterns of political competition. Under fragmented societal preferences, irrespective of political competition, reform brings little electoral gain and risks alienating a powerful bureaucracy. Preference fragmentation thus favors the persistence of institutional weakness. When societal preferences converge and a robust political opposition threatens incumbents, politicians face an electoral counterweight to the structural power of police, making reform likely. Using evidence from periods of continuity and reform in Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, the author traces both outcomes to shifts in societal preferences and political opposition. Despite the imperative to address citizens’ demands by building state capacity in security provision, these cases show that police reform is often rendered electorally disadvantageous.

中文翻译：

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制度弱点和变革的社会根源：拉丁美洲的偏好、权力和警察改革

尽管犯罪和暴力事件出现历史性增长，但拉丁美洲警察部队的特点是长期体制薄弱，不时出现罕见的全面改革。为了理解这些制度连续性和变化的模式，作者运用了结构性权力的概念，展示了警察如何利用他们对强制的控制来限制政治家可以使用的政策选择。在这个受限的政策空间内，政客们在连续性和改革之间做出选择，评估社会对警察改革的偏好和政治竞争的模式。在分散的社会偏好下，无论政治竞争如何，改革带来的选举收益微乎其微，并有可能疏远强大的官僚机构。因此，偏好碎片化有利于制度弱点的持续存在。当社会偏好趋于一致并且强大的政治反对派威胁到现任者时，政客们将面临与警察结构性权力相抗衡的选举权，从而使改革成为可能。作者利用阿根廷、巴西和哥伦比亚的连续性和改革时期的证据，将这两种结果都归因于社会偏好和政治反对的转变。尽管必须通过建设国家提供安全保障的能力来满足公民的需求，但这些案例表明，警察改革往往在选举中处于不利地位。作者将这两种结果都归因于社会偏好和政治反对的转变。尽管必须通过建设国家提供安全保障的能力来满足公民的需求，但这些案例表明，警察改革往往在选举中处于不利地位。作者将这两种结果都归因于社会偏好和政治反对的转变。尽管必须通过建设国家提供安全保障的能力来满足公民的需求，但这些案例表明，警察改革往往在选举中处于不利地位。