Political corruption is rampant in—and destructive to—many parts of the world. A growing number of international organizations (IOs) claim to address the problem by encouraging good governance norms and rules, such as anti-corruption standards and practices. Whether membership in IOs dampens corruption, however, is unclear. Our central argument is that the characteristics of IO membership determine both whether corruption is tolerated and the extent to which formal anti-corruption rules effectively combat the problem. First, groups of corrupt states are reticent to enforce good governance norms or rules against other IO members, rendering punishment for corruption incredible. Second, leaders may witness the value of corruption to their IO peers and learn to act the same way. Using a variety of data sources and estimation strategies, including new data on IO anti-corruption mandates, we demonstrate that: (1) countries that participate in member-corrupted IOs are significantly more likely to engage in corruption themselves—and experience an increase in corruption over time—than are countries that participate in less corrupt IOs; and (2) this tolerance for corruption occurs even within IOs that have adopted formal anti-corruption mandates, rendering good governance rules largely cheap talk among organizations governed by corrupt principles.

中文翻译：

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合作的阴暗面：国际组织与成员腐败

政治腐败在世界许多地方普遍存在，并具有破坏性。越来越多的国际组织（IO）声称通过鼓励善政规范和规则（例如反腐败标准和实践）来解决该问题。但是，尚不清楚IO的成员资格是否可以抑制腐败。我们的中心论点是，IO成员资格的特征既决定是否容忍腐败，又取决于正式的反腐败规则在多大程度上有效地解决了这一问题。首先，腐败国家集团不愿对其他IO成员实施善治规范或规则，从而使腐败处罚难以置信。其次，领导者可能会看到腐败对其IO同行的价值，并学会以同样的方式行事。使用各种数据源和估算策略，包括有关IO反腐败任务授权的新数据，我们证明：（1）参与成员腐败的IO的国家比参与IO的国家更有可能自己参与腐败，并且随着时间的流逝腐败现象会增加。较少的IO损坏；（2）即使在采用正式反腐败指令的IO内，也存在对腐败的容忍，这使得良好的治理规则在受腐败原则支配的组织之间大为cheap贬。