‘Third countries’ are frequently exploited by those involved in networks to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies, allowing procurement agents to obscure the end user or vendor located in the proliferating state, and to deceive industry, export licensing officials, and intelligence services. While ‘third countries’ frequently feature in illicit transactions, the academic literature exploring the roles played by entities in these jurisdictions is limited. Building on the sanctions busting literature, this article proposes a loose typology considering the ways in which third countries can be exploited by proliferation networks. The typology is illustrated using three cases involving entities based in Malaysia – A. Q. Khan’s nuclear black market network, and Iran and North Korea’s efforts to procure and market WMD-related and military goods. These cases are used to generate insights into proliferators’ selection of ‘third country’ hubs. The article argues that while exploitation of third countries by proliferation networks is a similar, but distinct phenomenon to trade-based sanctions busting, hubs of both activities share characteristics. Furthermore, the article argues that other factors beyond the lax regulatory environment, such as level of development, and personal connections, are often as important in driving the decisions of proliferation networks. The article concludes with implications for nonproliferation policy.

中文翻译：

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探索在扩散网络中使用“第三国”：以马来西亚为例

参与网络的人经常利用“第三国”来转让对扩散敏感的技术，使采购代理能够掩盖位于扩散国家的最终用户或供应商，并欺骗工业、出口许可官员和情报服务。虽然“第三国”经常出现在非法交易中，但探讨实体在这些司法管辖区所扮演角色的学术文献却很有限。在制裁破坏文献的基础上，本文提出了一种松散的类型学，考虑了扩散网络可以利用第三国的方式。使用涉及马来西亚实体的三个案例来说明这种类型——AQ Khan 的核黑市网络，以及伊朗和朝鲜采购和销售大规模杀伤性武器相关商品和军用商品的努力。这些案例用于深入了解扩散者对“第三国”中心的选择。文章认为，虽然扩散网络对第三国的剥削与破坏基于贸易的制裁类似但又截然不同，但这两种活动的中心具有共同的特征。此外，文章认为，除了宽松的监管环境之外，其他因素，如发展水平和人际关系，通常在推动扩散网络的决策方面同样重要。文章最后对防扩散政策产生了影响。这两项活动的中心具有共同的特点。此外，文章认为，除了宽松的监管环境之外，其他因素，如发展水平和人际关系，通常在推动扩散网络的决策方面同样重要。文章最后对防扩散政策产生了影响。这两项活动的中心具有共同的特点。此外，文章认为，除了宽松的监管环境之外，其他因素，如发展水平和人际关系，通常在推动扩散网络的决策方面同样重要。文章最后对防扩散政策产生了影响。