The role of corporations in the U.S. political process has received increased scrutiny in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court'sCitizens Uniteddecision, leading to calls for greater regulation. In this paper, we analyze whether policies mandating greater disclosure and shareholder approval of political contributions reduce risk and increase firm value, as proponents of such rules claim. Specifically, we examine the Neill Committee Report (NCR), which led to the passage of the United Kingdom's Political Parties, Elections, and Referendums Act 2000 mandating new disclosure and shareholder approval rules. We find that politically active firms did not benefit from the NCR in the days after its release and suffered a decline in value in the months and years that followed. Politically active firms also suffered an increase in risk, as proxied by stock return volatility, following the release of the NCR. We theorize that these findings are due to the reduced flexibility these rules impose on corporate strategy as well as the potential for these rules to facilitate political activism against corporations.

中文翻译：

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风险业务：公司政治捐款的披露和股东批准是否会影响公司业绩？

在美国最高法院的裁决之后，公司在美国政治进程中的作用受到了越来越多的审查公民联合决定，导致要求加强监管。在本文中，我们分析了要求更多披露和股东批准政治捐款的政策是否会降低风险并增加公司价值，正如此类规则的支持者所声称的那样。具体来说，我们审查了尼尔委员会报告 (NCR)，该报告导致英国通过了 2000 年政党、选举和公投法案，规定了新的披露和股东批准规则。我们发现，在 NCR 发布后的几天内，政治活跃的公司并没有从 NCR 中受益，并且在随后的几个月和几年中遭受了价值下降。在 NCR 发布后，以股票回报波动为代表的政治活跃公司的风险也增加了。