After the global financial crisis of 2007–9, policymakers hailed macroprudential policy as the solution to financial markets’ boom-bust patterns. Financial regulations would have to operate countercyclically, increasing in stringency during a boom while becoming lenient in a bust. Simultaneously, the procyclical effects of pre-crisis rules would have to be eliminated. Actual reforms, however, do not live up to these high hopes. In addition to the countercyclical policy framework's limited scope and ambition, its open-endedness is particularly striking. As policymakers have not specified when supervisors should (de)activate what instruments and how firms should measure risk, there is an inbuilt indeterminacy at macroprudential policy's core. I argue that obstacles inherent to the nature of systemic risk are key to understanding this policy outcome. As the financial system is reflexive, adaptive, and complex, there are hard limits to supervisors’ ability to “read” the financial cycle. Furthermore, as macroprudential policy itself becomes “part of financial markets,” countercyclical interventions may have systemically significant unintended consequences. This article empirically shows how policymakers at the global and EU level, confronted with these measurement and mitigation problems, ultimately opted for a limited and open-ended policy framework.

中文翻译：

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宏观审慎政策的开放性。内生风险是逆周期金融监管的障碍

在 2007-9 年全球金融危机之后，政策制定者称赞宏观审慎政策是金融市场繁荣-萧条模式的解决方案。金融监管必须以反周期方式运作，在繁荣时期增加严格程度，而在萧条时期变得宽松。同时，必须消除危机前规则的顺周期效应。然而，实际的改革并没有辜负这些寄予厚望的希望。反周期政策框架除了范围有限、雄心勃勃外，其开放性尤其引人注目。由于政策制定者没有具体说明监管者应该（停用）什么工具以及公司应该如何衡量风险，宏观审慎政策的核心存在内在的不确定性。我认为，系统性风险本质所固有的障碍是理解这一政策结果的关键。由于金融体系具有自反性、适应性和复杂性，监管者“解读”金融周期的能力受到严格限制。此外，随着宏观审慎政策本身成为“金融市场的一部分”，反周期干预可能会产生系统性的重大意外后果。本文以经验的方式展示了全球和欧盟层面的政策制定者如何面对这些衡量和缓解问题，最终选择了一个有限且开放的政策框架。” 反周期干预可能会产生系统性显着的意外后果。本文以经验的方式展示了全球和欧盟层面的政策制定者如何面对这些衡量和缓解问题，最终选择了一个有限且开放的政策框架。” 反周期干预可能会产生系统性显着的意外后果。本文以经验的方式展示了全球和欧盟层面的政策制定者如何面对这些衡量和缓解问题，最终选择了一个有限且开放的政策框架。