Interest groups face many choices when lobbying: when, who, and how to lobby. We study interest group lobbying across two stages of regulatory policymaking: the congressional and agency rulemaking stages. We investigate how the Securities and Exchange Commission responds to interest groups at the end of these stages using a new, comprehensive lobbying dataset on the Dodd-Frank Act. Our approach examines citations in the SEC's final rules which reference and acknowledge the lobbying activities of specific interest groups. We find that more than 2,900 organizations engaged in different types of lobbying activities either during the congressional bill stage, the agency rulemaking stage, or both. Meetings with the SEC and hiring former SEC employees are strongly associated with the citation of an organization in a final rule. Comments submitted by trade associations and members of Congress are cited more in a final rule compared to other organizations. While there is more variety in the types of organizations who lobby the bureaucracy than those who lobby Congress, presence does not necessarily lead to recognition or influence.

中文翻译：

---

游说中的存在和影响：来自多德-弗兰克的证据

利益集团在游说时面临许多选择：何时、谁以及如何游说。我们研究利益集团游说在监管政策制定的两个阶段：国会和机构规则制定阶段。我们使用关于多德-弗兰克法案的新的综合游说数据集调查证券交易委员会在这些阶段结束时如何回应利益集团。我们的方法检查 SEC 最终规则中引用并承认特定利益集团的游说活动的引用。我们发现，超过 2,900 个组织在国会法案阶段、机构规则制定阶段或两者兼而有之时参与了不同类型的游说活动。与 SEC 会面和雇用前 SEC 员工与最终规则中对组织的引用密切相关。与其他组织相比，最终规则中更多地引用了行业协会和国会议员提交的评论。虽然游说官僚机构的组织类型比游说国会的组织类型更多，但存在并不一定会导致认可或影响。