Drawing on data collected in interviews with investors and corporates in the United States and Europe, this paper sheds light on the motives behind shareholder engagement. It explains why index funds engage in corporate governance, despite their apparent lack of financial incentive to do so. Applying Hirschman's concepts of exit and loyalty to the investment management industry, this paper suggests that for many institutional shareholders today, voice is more feasible than exit. For the largest index investors, the cost of engagement has fallen to a level where it is today negligible. The immense concentration amongst index funds, with the three largest fund managers controlling over 90 percent of assets, ensures sufficient return on their governance investments. Furthermore, interviews with activist investors suggest that they have learned to work with index investors and that index funds do not present barriers to successful campaigns. This paper therefore advocates against restricting index funds’ voting rights. Doing so would muzzle those shareholders with the deepest pockets and the greatest potential for corporate oversight. Instead what is needed is regulation to ensure greater disclosure of engagement efforts by the largest fund companies enabling greater academic and public oversight of asset managers’ engagement activities.

中文翻译：

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股权集中度与机构投资者通过话语权和退出的治理

本文利用在美国和欧洲对投资者和企业的采访中收集的数据，阐明了股东参与背后的动机。它解释了为什么指数基金参与公司治理，尽管它们显然缺乏这样做的财务激励。本文将赫希曼的退出和忠诚概念应用于投资管理行业，认为对于当今的许多机构股东来说，发言权比退出更可行。对于最大的指数投资者而言，参与成本已降至今天可以忽略不计的水平。指数基金高度集中，三大基金经理控制着 90% 以上的资产，确保了其治理投资的充足回报。此外，对激进投资者的采访表明，他们已经学会了与指数投资者合作，并且指数基金不会对成功的活动构成障碍。因此，本文主张反对限制指数基金的投票权。这样做会扼杀那些财力最雄厚、公司监管潜力最大的股东。相反，需要监管以确保最大的基金公司更多地披露参与努力，从而对资产管理人的参与活动进行更大的学术和公众监督。这样做会扼杀那些财力最雄厚、公司监管潜力最大的股东。相反，需要监管以确保最大的基金公司更多地披露参与努力，从而对资产管理人的参与活动进行更大的学术和公众监督。这样做会扼杀那些财力最雄厚、公司监管潜力最大的股东。相反，需要监管以确保最大的基金公司更多地披露参与努力，从而对资产管理人的参与活动进行更大的学术和公众监督。