With participation quorums present in elections and referendums, supporters of the status quo have to decide whether to vote against the proposition or boycott it by abstaining altogether to achieve the same result. This paper examines why one strategy or the other is implemented, using data from recall elections in 376 Peruvian municipalities mandating a 50% participation quorum to validate the removal of the mayor. While instrumental rationality under situations of strategic uncertainty in competitive settings goes far in explaining the incidence of boycotts, a bounded rationality approach whereby actors rely on inferential heuristics through spatial diffusion and past experience produces similarly consistent results. Boycotts are also more likely when voter coordination is easier. Personal traits of the status quo elites, on the other hand, are irrelevant. The paper contributes to the understanding of the quorum paradox warning that measures to increase voter participation, such as the introduction of a participation quorum, may actually depress it.

在选举和全民公决中，由于参加会议达到了法定人数，现状的支持者必须决定是对这一提议投反对票还是通过完全弃权来抵制该提议，以取得相同的结果。本文使用376个秘鲁市镇的罢免选举数据（强制参加率达到50％的法定人数）来验证市长的罢免，从而研究了为什么实施一种或另一种策略。尽管在竞争环境中存在战略不确定性的情况下，工具理性在解释抵制事件的发生方面发挥了很大作用，但有限理性方法使参与者通过空间扩散和过去的经验依靠推论启发法产生相似的一致结果。抵制也更容易在选民的协调比较容易。另一方面，现状精英的个人特质，无关紧要。本文有助于理解法定人数悖论警告，即增加投票人数的措施（例如引入参与人数定额）实际上可能会压抑它。