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The constitution of patron–client relations and patronage appointments: a study of open and limited access
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2018-06-30 , DOI: 10.1007/s10602-018-9266-1
Louis Corriveau

I expound a game theoretical model of the constitution of patron–client relations and patronage appointments. For all parameter values, the game has open access equilibriums, where patronage does not occur. For some parameter values, it has also a limited access equilibrium, where patronage does occur. I prove open and limited access equilibriums are not Pareto-comparable to one another. Defining social welfare in utilitarian terms, I prove also that social welfare is maximised in a particular open access equilibrium, but that a limited access equilibrium can be a second-best solution, when it exists.

中文翻译:

赞助人 - 客户关系和赞助任命的构成:开放和有限访问的研究

我阐述了赞助人-客户关系和赞助人任命构成的博弈理论模型。对于所有参数值,博弈具有开放访问均衡,其中不发生赞助。对于某些参数值,它也有一个有限的访问均衡,在这种情况下确实会发生赞助。我证明了开放和有限访问均衡不是帕累托可比的。用功利主义的术语定义社会福利,我还证明了社会福利在特定的开放获取均衡中最大化,但有限获取均衡可以是次优解决方案,当它存在时。
更新日期:2018-06-30
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