What is the strategic incentive for governments and societies to delegate decision making to independent agents? I develop a framework taking into account preference uncertainty and the term length of independent agents in an environment with electoral and preference uncertainty and political polarization. Governments and societies face a trade-off concerning the predictability of decisions and the adaptability of to changing preferences. I find that governments, in general, tend to delegate too much and for too long from the point of view of society.

中文翻译：

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政治两极分化、任期长和授权过多

政府和社会将决策权委托给独立代理人的战略动机是什么？我开发了一个框架，考虑到偏好不确定性和独立代理人在具有选举和偏好不确定性以及政治两极分化的环境中的任期长度。政府和社会在决策的可预测性和对不断变化的偏好的适应性方面面临着权衡。我发现，从社会的角度来看，政府总体上倾向于授权过多且时间过长。