Recent debates on the nature of preferences in economics have typically assumed that they are to be interpreted either as behavioural regularities or as mental states. In this paper I challenge this dichotomy and argue that neither interpretation is consistent with scientific practice in choice theory and behavioural economics. Preferences are belief-dependent dispositions with a multiply realizable causal basis, which explains why economists are reluctant to make a commitment about their interpretation.

中文翻译：

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偏好：既不是行为上的也不是精神上的

最近关于经济学中偏好性质的辩论通常假设它们要么被解释为行为规律，要么被解释为心理状态。在本文中，我挑战了这种二分法，并认为这两种解释都不符合选择理论和行为经济学的科学实践。偏好是具有多重可实现因果基础的信念依赖倾向，这解释了为什么经济学家不愿对其解释做出承诺。