Growing concern with the panpsychist's ostensive inability to solve the ‘combination problem’ has led some authors to adopt a view titled ‘Cosmopsychism’. This position turns panpsychism on its head: rather than many tiny atomic minds, there is instead one cosmos-sized mind. It is supposed that this view voids the combination problem, however I argue that it does not. I argue that there is a ‘de-combination problem’ facing the cosmopsychist, which is equivalent to the combination problem as they are both concerned with subjects being proper parts of other subjects. I then propose two methods for both theorists to avoid the problem of subject-subject proper parthood relations: a distinction between absolute and relative phenomenal unity, and a modification of the essential nature of subjects. Of these two options, I find the latter option wanting and propose that the first should be adopted.

中文翻译：

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科目可以是科目的适当部分吗？去组合问题

对泛心论者表面上无法解决“组合问题”的日益关注导致一些作者采用了一种名为“宇宙心论”的观点。这一立场颠覆了泛心论：不是许多微小的原子思想，而是一个宇宙大小的思想。假设这种观点使组合问题无效，但我认为它没有。我认为宇宙心理学家面临着一个“去组合问题”，这相当于组合问题，因为他们都关注主体是其他主体的适当部分。然后，我为两位理论家提出了两种方法，以避免主体 - 主体适当的部分关系问题：绝对和相对现象统一之间的区别，以及对主体本质性质的修改。这两个选项中，