Philosophy Compass. 2018;e12494. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12494 Abstract How should knowledge be analyzed? Compositionally, as having constituents like belief and justification, or as an atomic concept? In making arguments for or against these perspectives, epistemologists have begun to use experimental evidence from developmental psychology and developmental linguistics. If we were to conclude that knowledge were developmentally prior to belief, then we might have a good basis to claim that belief is not a constituent of knowledge. In this review, I present a broad range of developmental evidence from the past decade and discuss some of the implications it has for the proper analysis of knowledge. The orthodox perspective from the developmental literature was one where children fail to understand belief and knowledge concepts until later in childhood (around 4–5 years of age), with typical asymmetries in belief attribution and knowledge attribution. But what emerges from both a discussion of newer findings and a contextualization of older findings is a picture of development whereby core competence with belief and knowledge concepts emerges much earlier than previously thought (in the first or second year of life) that apparent failures in later childhood may be explained by other aspects of development than conceptual development and that there is no clear evidence that knowledge attributions emerge earlier than belief attributions.

中文翻译：

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幼儿的知识观

哲学指南针。2018; e12494。https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12494摘要应该如何分析知识？从结构上来说，具有信念和辩护之类的要素，还是原子概念？在支持或反对这些观点时，认识论者已开始使用来自发展心理学和发展语言学的实验证据。如果我们要断定知识是在信仰之前发展的，那么我们可能有一个很好的依据来宣称信仰不是知识的组成部分。在这篇综述中，我提供了过去十年中广泛的发展证据，并讨论了它对知识的正确分析所具有的一些含义。从发展文学来看，正统的观点是儿童直到童年后期（4-5岁左右）才理解信仰和知识概念，在信仰归因和知识归因方面存在典型的不对称。但是，从对较新发现的讨论和对较旧发现的上下文化中得出的结果，都是一幅发展图景，即具有信念和知识概念的核心能力的出现要比以前认为的（生命的第一或第二年）要早得多，后来才出现明显的失败。儿童期的发展可能由概念发展以外的其他方面来解释，并且没有明确的证据表明知识归因早于信念归因。