According to Steven Nadler's novel interpretation of Spinoza's much discussed ‘free man’, the free man is not an unattainable ideal. On this reading, the free man represents an ideal condition not because he is passionless, as has often been claimed, but because even though he experiences passions, he ‘never lets those passions determine his actions’. In this paper, I argue that Nadler's interpretation is incorrect in taking the model of the free man to be an attainable ideal within our reach. Furthermore, I show that Spinoza's moral philosophy has room for another ideal yet attainable condition, which is represented by the wise man. On my reading, becoming a wise man consists not in surmounting human bondage, but in understanding ourselves as finite expressions of God's power and, thereby, coming to terms with the ineliminability of bondage for us due to our very human or modal condition in the Spinozistic universe.

中文翻译：

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斯宾诺莎伦理学中的两种伦理理想：自由人和智者

根据史蒂文·纳德勒对斯宾诺莎备受争议的“自由人”的新颖诠释，自由人并非遥不可及的理想。在这种解读中，自由人代表了一种理想状态，并不是因为他没有激情，正如人们经常声称的那样，而是因为即使他经历过激情，他“从不让这些激情决定他的行动”。在本文中，我认为纳德勒的解释是不正确的，因为他认为自由人的模式是我们可以实现的理想。此外，我还表明斯宾诺莎的道德哲学为另一种理想但可以实现的条件留有余地，即以智者为代表。在我的阅读中，成为一个智者并不在于超越人类的束缚，而是在于将自己理解为上帝力量的有限表达，从而，