I explore what Bernard Williams means by regarding one's action ‘purely externally, as one might regard anyone else's action’, and how it links to regret and agent-regret. I suggest some ways that we might understand the external view: as a failure to recognize what one has done, in terms of Williams's distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic luck, and as akin to Thomas Nagel's distinction between an internal and external view. I argue that none of these captures what Williams was getting at because they do not allow one to take a view on one's action. I offer two alternative accounts. One turns around what we identify with, the other concerns what we care about. Both accounts capture how I might regret, rather than agent-regret, my own action. I demonstrate that these accounts can explain the relationship between an insurance payout and the external view, and they can explain the agent-relativity of agent-regret.

中文翻译：

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伯纳德·威廉姆斯（Bernard Williams）关于纯粹从外部考虑自己的行为

我通过看待一个人的行为“纯粹是外在的，就像人们可能会看待其他人的行为一样”来探讨伯纳德·威廉姆斯的含义，以及它如何与后悔和代理后悔相关联。我提出了一些我们可以理解外部观点的方法：根据威廉姆斯对内在运气和外在运气的区别，以及类似于托马斯内格尔对内部观点和外部观点的区别，未能认识到自己做了什么。我认为这些都没有抓住威廉姆斯的意思，因为它们不允许人们对自己的行为发表看法。我提供两个替代帐户。一个围绕我们认同的东西，另一个关注我们关心的东西。这两个帐户都记录了我可能会如何后悔，而不是代理后悔自己的行为。