This paper develops an account of metaphysical explanation according to which metaphysical explanations are answers to what-makes-it-the-case-that questions. On this view, metaphysical explanations are not to be considered entirely objective, but are subject to epistemic constraints imposed by the context in which a relevant question is asked. The resultant account of metaphysical explanation is developed independently of any particular views about grounding. Toward the end of the paper an application of the view is proposed that takes metaphysical explanations conceived in this way to characterize reality's structure. According to this proposal, reality's structure is partly constituted by a projection of our explanatory practices onto reality.

中文翻译：

---

问答：形而上学的解释和现实的结构

本文发展了形而上学解释的说明，据此，形而上学解释是对是什么造就了这种情况问题。根据这种观点，形而上学的解释不应被认为是完全客观的，而是受到提出相关问题的背景所施加的认识约束。形而上学解释的结果说明是独立于关于接地. 在论文的最后，提出了一种观点的应用，该观点采用以这种方式构想的形而上学解释来表征现实的结构。根据这个提议，现实的结构部分是由我们的解释实践对现实的投射构成的。