Galen Strawson's Basic Argument is that because self-creation is required to be truly morally responsible and self-creation is impossible, it is impossible to be truly morally responsible for anything. I contend that the Basic Argument is unpersuasive and unsound. First, I argue that the moral luck debate shows that the self-creation requirement appears to be contradicted and supported by various parts of our commonsense ideas about true moral responsibility, and that this ambivalence undermines the only reason that Strawson gives for the self-creation requirement. Second, I argue that the self-creation requirement is so demanding that either it is an implausible requirement for a species of true moral responsibility that we take ourselves to have or it is a plausible requirement of a species of true moral responsibility that we have never taken ourselves to have. Third, I explain that Strawson overgeneralizes from instances of constitutive luck that obviously undermine true moral responsibility to all kinds of constitutive luck.

中文翻译：

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构成性道德运气和斯特劳森关于道德责任不可能性的论证

盖伦·斯特劳森的基本论点是，因为自我创造需要真正在道德上负责，而自我创造是不可能的，所以不可能对任何事情真正在道德上负责。我认为基本论点没有说服力和不合理。首先，我认为道德运气辩论表明，自我创造的要求似乎与我们关于真正道德责任的常识观念的各个部分相矛盾和支持，并且这种矛盾心理破坏了斯特劳森给出的自我创造的唯一理由要求。第二，我认为，自我创造的要求是如此苛刻，以至于它要么是对我们认为自己拥有的真正道德责任的一种不合理的要求，要么是对我们从未承担过的真正道德责任的一种似是而非的要求拥有。第三，我解释说，斯特劳森从明显破坏真正道德责任的构成运气的实例过度概括为各种构成运气。