Many of those working on moral responsibility assume that once blameworthy, always blameworthy. They believe that blameworthiness, like diamonds, is forever. In this article, we argue that blameworthiness is not forever; rather, it can diminish through time. We begin by showing that the view that blameworthiness is forever is best understood as the claim that personal identity is sufficient for diachronic blameworthiness. We argue that this view should be rejected because it entails that blameworthiness for past action is completely divorced from the distinctive psychological features of the person at the later time. This is because on none of the leading accounts of personal identity does identity require the preservation of any distinctive psychological features, but merely requires some form of continuity. The claim that blameworthiness is forever should therefore be rejected. We then sketch an account of blameworthiness over time, and consider two objections.

中文翻译：

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责备是永远的吗？

许多从事道德责任的人认为，一旦该受责备，就永远该受责备。他们相信应受责备，就像钻石一样，是永恒的。在本文中，我们认为可责备性不是永远的；相反，它会随着时间的推移而减少。我们首先表明，可责备永远存在的观点最好理解为个人身份足以构成历时的可责备的主张。我们认为这种观点应该被拒绝，因为它意味着过去行为的责任与后来人的独特心理特征完全脱节。这是因为在个人身份的主要叙述中，身份都不需要保留任何独特的心理特征，而只需要某种形式的连续性。因此，应该拒绝接受责备永远存在的说法。然后，我们勾勒出随着时间的推移对可责备性的描述，并考虑两个反对意见。