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Virtue, Rule-Following, and Absolute Prohibitions
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2019-04-01 , DOI: 10.1017/apa.2018.43
JEREMY REID

In her seminal article ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) Elizabeth Anscombe argued that we need a new ethics, one that uses virtue terms to generate absolute prohibitions against certain act-types. Leading contemporary virtue ethicists have not taken up Anscombe's challenge in justifying absolute prohibitions and have generally downplayed the role of rule-following in their normative theories. That they have not done so is primarily because contemporary virtue ethicists have focused on what is sufficient for characterizing the deliberation and action of the fully virtuous person, and rule-following is inadequate for this task. In this article, I take up Anscombe's challenge by showing that rule-following is necessary for virtuous agency, and that virtue ethics can justify absolute prohibitions. First, I offer a possibility proof by showing how virtue ethics can generate absolute prohibitions in three ways: by considering actions that directly manifest vice or that cannot be performed virtuously; actions that are prohibited by one's institutional roles and practical identities; and actions that are prohibited by the prescriptions of the wise. I then seek to show why virtue ethicists should incorporate rule-following and absolute prohibitions into their theories. I emphasize the central role that rules have in the development of virtue, then motivate the stronger view that fully virtuous agents follow moral rules by considering the importance of hope, uncertainty about consequences, and taking responsibility for what eventuates. Finally, I provide an account of what Anscombe called a ‘corrupt mind’, explaining how our understanding of virtue is corrupted if we think that virtue may require us to do vicious actions.

中文翻译:

美德、遵守规则和绝对禁止

在她的开创性文章《现代道德哲学》(1958 年)中,伊丽莎白·安斯科姆(Elizabeth Anscombe)认为我们需要一种新的伦理,一种使用美德术语来绝对禁止某些行为类型的伦理。当代主要的美德伦理学家没有接受安斯库姆在为绝对禁令辩护方面的挑战,并且普遍淡化了规则遵循在他们的规范理论中的作用。他们之所以没有这样做,主要是因为当代美德伦理学家关注的是什么足以表征完全有德的人的深思熟虑和行动,而遵守规则不足以完成这项任务。在这篇文章中,我接受了 Anscombe 的挑战,表明遵守规则对于美德机构是必要的,美德伦理可以证明绝对禁止是正当的。第一的,我通过展示美德伦理如何以三种方式产生绝对禁令来提供一种可能性证明:通过考虑直接表现出恶习或不能以美德进行的行为;一个人的机构角色和实际身份所禁止的行为;以及智者的处方所禁止的行为。然后我试图说明为什么美德伦理学家应该将遵守规则和绝对禁止纳入他们的理论。我强调规则在美德发展中的核心作用,然后通过考虑希望的重要性、对后果的不确定性以及对最终发生的事情承担责任,激发了一种更强烈的观点,即完全有道德的主体遵循道德规则。最后,我提供了一个关于 Anscombe 所谓的“腐败思想”的描述,
更新日期:2019-04-01
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